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ABSTRACT
This history of the concept of fact reveals that the fact-oriented practices of German
physicists and historians derived from common origins. The concept of fact became part
of the German language remarkably late. It gained momentum only toward the end of
the eighteenth century. I show that the concept of fact emerged as part of a historical
knowledge tradition, which comprised both human and natural empirical study. Around
1800, parts of this tradition, including the concept of fact, were integrated into the
epistemological basis of several emerging disciplines, including physics and historiog-
raphy. During this process of discipline formation, the concept of fact remained fluid.
I reveal this fluidity by unearthing different interpretations and roles of facts in different
German contexts around 1800. I demonstrate how a fact-based epistemology emerged
at the University of Go¨ttingen in the late eighteenth century, by focusing on universal
historian August Ludwig Schlo¨zer and the experimentalist Georg Christoph Lichten-
berg. In a time of scientific and political revolutions, they regarded facts as eternal
knowledge, contrasting them with short-lived theories and speculations. Remarkably,
Schlo¨zer and Lichtenberg construed facts as the basis of Wissenschaft, but not as
Wissenschaft itself. Only after 1800, empirically minded German physicists and histor-
ians granted facts self-contained value. As physics and historiography became institu-
tionalized at German universities, the concept of fact acquired different interpretations
in different disciplinary settings. These related to fact-oriented research practices, such
as precision measurement in physics and source criticism in historiography.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, due to the ubiquity of “fake news” and “alternative facts,” it seems to
be increasingly difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction.1 For sure, this
is an alarming development. But for some historians, philosophers, and sociol-
ogists of knowledge, the current circumstances offer at least one advantage: the
rise of the so-called post-truth society has put facts under a magnifying glass,
and made their work, which analyzes the processes involved in the making
of facts, even more urgent. Yet, one fundamental issue has remained under-
exposed in the literature on the dynamics of factual knowledge:2 what actually
is a “fact”?
Although more urgent than ever, it turns out that this question is difficult to
answer. From a historical point of view, this is because there have existed many
different interpretations of the concept of fact over the past few centuries. It
would be misleading to assume that the definition of a fact is etched in stone.
Indeed, the fact is a relatively recent notion, and it has experienced a tumul-
tuous history.3 Like “probability” and “objectivity,”4 it has never been self-
evident, even though today these epistemological categories may produce, to
quote Ian Hacking, a “feeling of inevitability.”5
1. The phrase “alternative facts” was introduced by Kellyane Conway in 2017 and then culti-
vated by Donald Trump and his entourage. Jon Swaine, “Donald Trump’s team defends ‘alter-
native facts’ after widespread protests,” The Guardian, 23 Jan 2017; https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2017/jan/22/donald-trump-kellyanne-conway-inauguration-alternative-facts (accessed 18
Oct 2018).
2. Two classic examples are: Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social
Construction of Scientific Facts (London: Sage Publications, 1979); Steven Shapin and Simon
Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). A more
recent example is: Peter Howlett and Mary S. Morgan, eds., How Well Do Facts Travel? (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
3.On the early modern origins of the concept of fact: Lorraine Daston, “Marvelous Facts and
Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern Europe,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (1991): 93–124; Mary
Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England,
1550–1720 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2000). On the use of the concept of fact in later
periods: e.g., Theodore M. Porter, “Statistical and Social Facts from Quetelet to Durkheim,”
Sociological Perspectives 38, no. 1 (1995): 15–26; Jan Frercks, “Demonstrating the Facticity of Facts:
University Lectures and Chemistry as a Science in Germany around 1800,” Ambix 57, no. 1
(2010): 64–83; Maria Pia Donato, “A Science of Facts? Classifying and Using Records in the
French Imperial Archives under Napoleon,” History of Humanities 2, no. 1 (2017): 79–100.
4. Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975);
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007).
5. Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 21.
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This misleading feeling of inevitability might have also influenced those
uncovering the social processes by which facts are made, such as Bruno Latour.
In an essay published in 2004, Latour admitted that he had previously been
“accepting much too uncritically what matters of fact were.”6 One finds similar
observations in the work of historical epistemologists such as Lorraine Daston.7
“Although historians and philosophers of science have worried that facts may be
‘contaminated’ by theory or ‘constructed’ by society,” Daston has noted, “the
category of the factual has remained curiously unanalyzed . . .The concept of
what kind of thing or event qualifies as a scientific fact, and when and why it
does, has escaped investigation.”8
In this article, I study the origins and transformations of the concept of fact
in German academic culture around 1800. This era was crucial for the emer-
gence of modernWissenschaft, which comprised a system of disciplines we now
consider to belong to either the sciences or the humanities.9 As it turns out,
facts played a significant role in this development. I highlight this role by
focusing on the increasing importance of facts in two disciplines that took
shape around 1800: physics and historiography.
Historians of science have referred to the period around 1800 as the
“great transition.”10 During this transitional phase, the hierarchically related
6. Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of
Concern,” Critical inquiry 30, no. 2 (2004): 225–48, on 231.
7. In Hacking’s words, the subgenre of historical epistemology—sometimes labeled
“historical meta-epistemology” or “historical ontology”—studies “epistemological concepts . . . as
objects that evolve and mutate.” Hacking, Historical Ontology (ref. 5), 8–9. On historical epis-
temology, see also: Lorraine Daston, “Historical Epistemology,” in Questions of Evidence: Proof,
Practice, and Persuasion across the Disciplines, ed. James Chandler, Arnold I. Davidson, and Harry
D. Harootunian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 282–89; Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger,
On Historicizing Epistemology: An Essay (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Omar
W. Nasim, “Was ist historische Epistemologie?,” in Nach Feierabend, ed. David Gugerli et al.,
(Zu¨rich: Diaphanes, 2013), 123–44.
8. Lorraine Daston, “Description by Omission: Nature Enlightened and Obscured,” in Re-
gimes of Description: In the Archive of the Eighteenth Century, ed. John Bender and Michael
Marrinan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 11–24, on 12–13.
9. The German term Wissenschaft can refer either to the whole of natural and human
knowledge enterprises, or to the body of knowledge they produce. During the nineteenth cen-
tury, German physicists and historians both labelled their subjects as wissenschaftlich. It would
thus be misleading to consider Wissenschaft as a direct translation of the English term “science,”
which is usually taken to exclude disciplines such as history and philology and the knowledge
these disciplines produce.
10.Originally proposed in the 1980s, there have been recent attempts to start reusing the term:
R. Steven Turner, “The Great Transition and the Social Patterns of German Science,” Minerva
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knowledge traditions of mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural his-
tory gave way to a non-hierarchical system of disciplines.11 The period
around 1800 was of crucial importance for the development of the modern
humanities as well. The study of language, culture, and history experienced
major shifts at the turn of the nineteenth century, on both a conceptual and
an institutional level.12 For example, it was the formative period of German
historicism.13 Furthermore, disciplines like history and linguistics became
institutionalized at German universities.14
Although the formation of modernWissenschaft in the decades around 1800
has been studied fairly extensively, there is still a lot to gain.15 For one thing,
the literature about the period disintegrates into two largely separated histor-
iographies: one focuses on the sciences, the other on the humanities.16
Whereas such a dualistic evaluation may seem logical from a contemporary
point of view, it fails to do justice to the reality of scholarship at the time.
-
25, no. 1–2 (1987): 56–76; Kathryn M. Olesko, “Coming to Terms with the Past: The Great
Transition,” Isis 108, no. 4 (2017): 841–45.
11. Rudolf Stichweh, Zur Entstehung des modernen Systems wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984). Some have put emphasis on developments in the
French rather than the German context: e.g., Johan Heilbron, “A Regime of Disciplines: Toward
a Historical Sociology of Disciplinary Knowledge,” in The Dialogical Turn: New Roles for Sociology
in the Postdisciplinary Age, ed. Charles M. Camic and Hans Joas (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2004), 23–42.
12. For an exploration of these shifts, see the contributions in Rens Bod, Jaap Maat, and Thijs
Weststeijn, eds., The Making of the Humanities: Volume II, From Early Modern to Modern Dis-
ciplines (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012).
13. Frederick C. Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), 1–26.
14. Bart Karstens, “Bopp the Builder. Discipline Formation as Hybridization: The Case of
Comparative Linguistics,” in Bod et al., The Making of the Humanities (ref. 12), 103–28.
15. For example, it has been encouraged to study the bonds between Wissenschaft and state-
driven technology in the German-speaking states: Ursula Klein, Humboldts Preußen: Wissenschaft
und Technik im Aufbruch (Darmstadt: WBG, 2015); Olesko, “Coming to Terms” (ref. 10); Patrick
Anthony, “Mining as the Working World of Alexander von Humboldt’s Plant Geography and
Vertical Cartography,” Isis 109, no. 1 (2018): 28–55.
16. On the sciences, see: Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams, “De-Centring the ‘Big
Picture’: The Origins of Modern Science and the Modern Origins of Science, The British Journal
for the History of Science 26, no. 4 (1993): 407–32; David Cahan, ed., From Natural Philosophy to
the Sciences: Writing the History of Nineteenth-Century Science (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2003). On the humanities, see: Rens Bod, A New History of the Humanities: The Search for
Principles and Patterns from Antiquity to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013);
James Turner, Philology: The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 2014).
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Before 1800, few German intellectuals focused on either human or natural
study exclusively. For a considerable part of the nineteenth century, moreover,
the categories of science (Naturwissenschaften) and humanities (Geisteswis-
senschaften) did not exist.17 Because of the entanglement of human and natural
study in the German-speaking lands in the decades around 1800, it is impor-
tant to consider these realms of knowledge in relation to one another.18
My focus on the history of the concept of fact demands such integration.19
Like recently written histories of “data,” this history of the fact draws attention
to “relationships, convergences, and contingent historical developments that
can be obscured following more traditional areas of focus on individual dis-
ciplines,” thus highlighting “interactions between ostensibly distinct knowl-
edge traditions.”20 In particular, this history of the fact reveals an essential link
17. Even after these categories had emerged, there were many interconnections between
humanities and science. For example, plant physiologists and paleographers collaborated to date
old manuscripts, physicists and astronomers analyzing spectra were inspired by deciphering
practices in Egyptology, and historicism was not confined to the historical sciences, but extended
into the life sciences. Josephine Musil-Gutsch, “On the Same Page: Investigating Material
Remains of Science and Humanities’ Knowledge-Producing Practices,” History of Humanities
(forthcoming); Matthias Do¨rries, “Heinrich Kayser as Philologist of Physics,”Historical Studies in
the Physical and Biological Sciences 26, no. 1 (1995): 1–33; Marianne Klemun, “Historismus/His-
torismen—Geschichtliches und Naturkundliches: Identita¨t—Episteme—Praktiken,” in Wis-
senschaftliche Forschung in O¨sterreich 1800–1900: Spezialisierung, Organisation, Praxis, ed.
Christine Ottner, Gerhard Holzer, and Petra Svatek (Go¨ttingen: V&R unipress, 2015), 17–42.
18. Recently, there have been several calls to study the history of humanities and science in an
integrated manner: Rens Bod and Julia Kursell, “Focus: The History of Humanities and the
History of Science,” Isis 106, no. 2 (2015): 337–90; Fabian Kra¨mer, “Forum: The Two Cultures
Revisited; The Sciences and the Humanities in a Longue Dure´e Perspective,” History of Humanities
3, no. 1 (2018): 5–88; Rens Bod, Jeroen van Dongen, Sjang L. ten Hagen, Bart Karstens, and Emma
Mojet, “The Flow of Cognitive Goods: A Novel Framework for the Historical Study of Epistemic
Transfer,” Isis (forthcoming).
19. Mary Poovey has argued that her focus on the history of the concept of fact enabled her “to
expose the connections between knowledge projects as different as rhetoric, natural philosophy,
moral philosophy, and early versions of the modern social sciences.” Poovey,History of Modern Fact
(ref. 3), xiv–xv. On the general relation between conceptual history and interdisciplinarity: Irmline
Veit-Brause, “The Interdisciplinarity of History of Concepts—A bridge between disciplines,”
History of Concepts Newsletter 6 (2003): 8–13; Ernst Mu¨ller, “Introduction: Interdisciplinary Con-
cepts and their Political Significance,” Contributions to the History of Concepts 6, no. 2 (2011): 42–52.
20. David Sepkoski, “Data in Time: Statistics, Natural History, and the Visualization of
Temporal Data,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 48, no. 5 (2018), 581–93, on 581. On the
history of “data,” see the contributions in: Soraya de Chadarevian and Theodore M. Porter,
“Special Issue: Histories of Data and the Database,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 48,
no. 5 (2018), 549–684; Elena Aronova, Christine von Oertzen, and David Sepkoski, eds., Data
Histories, Osiris 32 (2017).
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between the disciplines of physics and history. In what follows, I show that the
fact-oriented epistemologies and practices of German physicists and historians,
which gained momentum over the course of the nineteenth century, derived
from common origins. The concept of fact in Germany initially existed as part
of a so-called historical knowledge tradition, which comprised any kind of
empirical study. Around 1800, elements of this historical tradition, including
the concept of fact, became part of the epistemological foundations of the
emerging disciplines of history and physics. I argue that, as part of this trans-
formation, the roles and interpretations assigned to facts transformed as well.
To sum up, my aim in this paper is twofold. First, I aim to enrich the history
of the concept of fact by examining its emergence and transformations in the
German context around 1800. Second, I aim to uncover connections between
the formation histories of physics and historiography by drawing parallels
between the emergence of fact-oriented methods in these disciplines.
In the next section, I begin by explaining how the concept of fact entered
German scholarly language.21 The core of this study follows in the subsequent
sections, which focus on the late-eighteenth-century University of Go¨ttingen.
First, I explain why this is a relevant context to study the dynamics of the great
transition. Subsequently, I examine the rise of a fact-based epistemology
among Go¨ttingen scholars with seemingly diverse yet epistemologically related
backgrounds, including Univeral-Historie and Naturlehre. In the final parts of
this article, I examine how the still fluid concept of fact became part of the
disciplinary vocabularies of physicists and historians in the early nineteenth
century. My focus then shifts from Go¨ttingen toward main nodes of discipline
formation in the German-speaking lands after 1800. I argue that the concept of
fact experienced a profound transformation in these contexts, which was an
important factor in the materialization of physics and historiography as auton-
omous academic disciplines.
THE 18TH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF THE WO¨RTLEIN THATSACHE
The origins of the early modern usage of the concept of fact lie in sixteenth-
century England. The concept was first used in English law and human
21.Unfortunately, the history of the fact in German public spheres falls beyond the scope of this
study. Yet it is most likely that the term “fact,” like the term Naturwissenschaft, was a co-product of
learned and public environments. On the latter example: Denise Phillips, Acolytes of Nature:
Defining Natural Science in Germany, 1770–1850 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).
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history. For sixteenth-century English lawyers and historians, facts, or “matters
of fact,” were alleged acts or deeds of which the occurrence was in contention.
So, a fact could be untrue. When scholars started to apply the concept of fact to
study nature, its meaning changed. For seventeenth-century natural philoso-
phers, facts became empirically established truths. The emergence of the
English “culture of fact” has been studied thoroughly.22 But much less is
known about the introduction of the fact to other languages.
Histories of the fact in different European cultures were intertwined, since
these cultures all developed from the Latin early modern knowledge tradition.
The Latin term factum was a common point of reference for scholars working
in France, England, and Germany.23 Remarkably, the German language
incorporated the concept rather late when compared to the English, but also
to the French. An explanation for this may be that Latin remained the
dominant language among intellectuals in the German states until the begin-
ning of the eighteenth century.24 German only gained prestige from the
beginning of the eighteenth century onward, when prominent German
philosophers such as Christian Wolff (1679–1754) began to publish in the
vernacular.25 With this development came a need for linguistic innovations to
accommodate for concepts that had until then only existed in other lan-
guages. The fact was one of such examples. The term factum already existed
in Latin texts by German scholars, and was usually interpreted as a deed or
event.26 From the mid-eighteenth century onward, Factum (or Faktum)
began to be used as a German word as well, and was interpreted the same
as its Latin precedent.27
To some extent, the introduction of the concept of fact in German culture
can thus be understood as part of a conversion of the conceptual framework of
22. Shapiro, Culture of Fact (ref. 3).
23. Lorraine Daston, “Baconsche Tatsachen,” Rechtsgeschichte 1, no. 1 (2002): 36–55, on 39.
24.Michael D. Gordin, Scientific Babel (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 42;
Phillips, Acolytes of Nature (ref. 21), 53–57.
25. Wolgang Walter Menzel, Vernakula¨re Wissenschaft, Christian Wolffs Bedeutung fu¨r
die Herausbildung und Durchsetzung des Deutschen als Wissenschaftssprache (Tu¨bingen:
Niemeyer, 1996).
26. A renowned early eighteenth-century universal lexicon defined the term factum as a deed
or event. In German: “eine That, das geschehene Ding, oder eine Geschichte, das Werck, die
Verrichtung, der Verlauff eines ergangenen Handels.” Johann H. Zedler, Grosses Vollsta¨ndiges
Universallexicon Aller Wissenschaften und Ku¨nste, vol. 9, (Leipzig/Halle, 1735), 65–66.
27. Hans Schulz and Otto Basler, Deutsches Fremdwo¨rterbuch, vol. 5 (Berlin: De Gruyter,
2004), 658–60.
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knowledge from Latin to German: factum became Factum. Yet, this is only part
of the story. A crucial moment in the German history of the fact was in 1756,
when the term Thatsache was coined by the Scottish-German pastor Johann
Joachim Spalding (1714–1804).28 The term was a translation of a term used by
the English theologian Joseph Butler’s (1692–1752): “matter of fact.”29 In the
1770s and 1780s, Thatsachen played a major role in debates about Deism in
German theology, where they were defined as historically attested biblical acts,
actions, and events. In this particular context, facts were not regarded as true,
but only as probable.30
In the late eighteenth century, the co-existence of the terms Factum and
Thatsache in the German language made for a complex terminological pic-
ture. What is more, the precise meaning and function of these terms re-
mained an open issue. An astute observation by the prominent German
writer and theologian Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) illustrates the
point. In 1781, Lessing noted how suddenly and dramatically the use of the
Wo¨rtlein Thatsache had increased: “I rightly say: little word, while it is still so
young. I very well remember the time when nobody used it. I do not know
how this little word [Thatsache] has become so popular that in some literature
one cannot turn a page without stumbling upon a [Thatsache].” Lessing also
discussed the term Factum, which he identified as related but of which he
thought the meaning was already clear: “[Facta] and [Faits] are just [gesche-
hene Dinge, Begebenheiten, Thaten, Ereignisse, Vorfa¨lle] of which the historical
certainty is as great as historical certainty can be.”31 The exact meanings of
and relations between these increasingly popular terms, especially Thatsache,
were unclear to Lessing. His remarks reveal that the concept of fact, in its
multiple linguistic guises, was regarded as both novel and fluid in Germany
in the late eighteenth century.
The use of the terms Factum, Faktum, and Thatsache increased exponen-
tially in the final decades of the eighteenth century (Fig. 1). Simultaneously, the
28. Karlfried Gru¨nder,Historisches Wo¨rterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 10 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag,
1998), 910–16. Around 1900, the common spelling of the word became Tatsache.
29. The theological-historical origins of the concept of fact in Germany thus interlinked with
the English context. Shapiro, Culture of Fact (ref. 3), 168–88.
30. Reinhart Staats, “Der Theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund des Begriffes ‘Tatsache’,”
Zeitschrift fu¨r Theologie und Kirche 70, no. 3 (1973): 316–45.
31. Gotthold E. Lessing, “U¨ber das Wo¨rtlein Thatsache,” in Sa¨mmtliche Schriften, vol. 11, ed.
Karl Lachmann (Berlin: Voß, 1839), 645. Translation of German quotes into English are mine,
unless stated otherwise.
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Latin words datum and data came into wider circulation.32 These and other
German terms, such as Begebenheit, all related to the concept of fact that
gradually emerged in Germany around 1800.33 Ultimately, however, Thatsache
became a much more popular term than its Latinist counterparts.
How can the growing popularity of these terms be explained? And which
transformations occurred as the concept of fact spread through German
FIG. 1. Factum/Facta and Thatsache(n) in German texts. Relative summed frequencies of
“Thatsache/Thatsachen” and “Factum/Faktum/Facta/Factum” in German texts, as obtained on
13 February 2018 via Google Books Ngram Viewer, using a smoothing of 3. Given the evident
limits of the Google Books text corpus for historical research, particularly in the period studied,
this plot should be interpreted not too literally. Nevertheless, it does give a clear indication both
of the late eighteenth-century origin of the “fact” in Germany and the co-existence of Factum
and Thatsache in this period. On Google Books as a tool for research, see: Eitan Adam
Pechenick, Christopher M. Danforth, and Peter Sheridan Dodds, “Characterizing the Google
Books corpus: Strong limits to inferences of socio-cultural and linguistic evolution,” PloS one 10,
no. 10 (2015): e0137041.
32. In 1768, Herder used factum and datum interchangeably with Begebenheit. Johann G.
Herder, “A¨lteres kritisches Wa¨ldchen,” in Schriften zur A¨sthetik und Literatur 1767–1781, ed.
Gunter E. Grimm (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1993), 11–56, on 11–12.
33. On the emergence of the concept of fact in late eighteenth-century German philosophy
and literature: Paul Ziche, “‘Ho¨herer’ Empirismus: Passive Wissenschaft, Letzte Tatsachen und
Experimentelle Philosophie bei FWJ Schelling,” in Philosophie und Wissenschaft / Philosophy and
Science, ed. Ju¨rgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 165–84; Juliane Vogel,
“Die Ku¨rze des Faktums: Texto¨konomien des Wirklichen um 1800,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift
fu¨r Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 89, no. 3 (2015): 297–306; Johannes Lehmann,
“Faktum, Anekdote, Geru¨cht: Zur Begriffsgeschichte der ‘Thatsache’ und ‘Kleists Berliner
Abendbla¨ttern’,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fu¨r Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 89,
no. 3 (2015): 307–22; Jocelyn Holland, “Facts are What One Makes of Them: Constructing the
Faktum in the Enlightenment and Early German Romanticism,” in Fact and Fiction: Literary and
Scientific Cultures in Germany and Britain, ed. Christine Lehleiter (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2016), 33–49.
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learned culture in different verbal forms? In the following, I aim to answer
these questions by focusing on the University of Go¨ttingen. I discuss how and
why “facts” became important in Go¨ttingen physics and historiography in the
late eighteenth century. I also show that, while this happened, these still
interrelated fields of study gradually began to differentiate.
THE UNIVERSITY OF GO¨TTINGEN BEFORE 1800
By the end of the eighteenth century, the city of Go¨ttingen in the Kingdom of
Hannover had developed into the main knowledge hub of the Holy Roman
Empire. The city’s young and vibrant Georg-August-Universita¨t, founded in
1737, was populated by an internationally oriented and renowned intellectual
community. The scholarly environment in Go¨ttingen also featured a world-
famous library, leading journals, and a prominent Academy.34
In the Go¨ttingen context, the so-called fourth faculty of philosophy expe-
rienced a boost, and gained independence with respect to the previously
dominant faculties of law, medicine, and theology. The philosophical faculty
accommodated relatively independent institutional environments for a range
of subject areas, for example, by implementing increasingly specialized pro-
fessorial chairs. The institutional structure of Go¨ttingen’s university func-
tioned as an example for nineteenth-century reforms at other German
universities, among them, the university in Berlin.35 For these reasons, the
late-eighteenth-century Go¨ttingen context is a suitable one for studying the
transformations that led to the establishment of the modern system of
knowledge disciplines.
As a result of the foundation of specialized professorial chairs and disciplinary
institutes, physics and historiography started to develop within separate institu-
tional contexts in late-eighteenth-century Go¨ttingen. With regard to historiog-
raphy, an important development was the foundation of the specialized Institute
for Historical Sciences in 1764. Martin Gierl has argued that this institute linked
“systematic research, training of historians, recording of sources and institutio-
nalization of the discipline,” and hence was “an institutional signpost in the
34. Dirk van Miert, “Structuring the History of Knowledge in an Age of Transition: The
Go¨ttingen Geschichte between Historia Literaria and the Rise of the Disciplines,” History of
Humanities 2, no. 2 (2017): 389–416, on 392.
35. Rudolf Stichweh, “The Sociology of Scientific Disciplines: On the Genesis and Stability of
the Disciplinary Structure of Modern Science,” Science in Context 5, no. 1 (1992): 3–15, on 9.
HOW “FACTS ” SHAPED MODERN D I SC I P L I NES | 309
development of modern historiography.”36 In the following, I discuss the role
and importance of facts in the so-called Go¨ttingen School of History, paying
specific attention to its authoritative members, Johann Christoph Gatterer
(1727–1799) and August Ludwig Schlo¨zer (1735–1809). Subsequently, I focus
on Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799), who played a significant role in
the development of German experimental physics.
Although dynamics of differentiation had gotten into gear, neither physics
nor history functioned as autonomous disciplines in Go¨ttingen or elsewhere in
the German-speaking states around 1800. Physics (Physik or Experimentalphy-
sik), like chemistry (Chemie), existed as a combination of elements from nat-
ural philosophy (Naturlehre), natural history (Naturgeschichte), and applied
mathematics (Angewandte Mathematik).37 When experimental physics and
chemistry came to be seen as independent areas of research, new classifications
of knowledge started to interfere with older ones; different definitions of
Naturlehre, Physik, and Chemie existed alongside each other. The uncrystal-
lized status of “physics” in Germany and the shifting significance of Naturlehre
and Physik around 1800 implies that it is not without problems to refer to
Lichtenberg and his contemporaries as “physicists.” Indeed, Lichtenberg’s
intellectual pursuits extended over a range of subject areas, which remained
fundamentally intertwined.
The same applies to the Go¨ttingen “historians” I have just mentioned.
Although Gatterer and Schlo¨zer aimed to establish autonomous ground for
history, their scholarly enterprise was strongly affiliated with philosophical,
philological, and statistical practice.38 Moreover, both Gatterer and Schlo¨zer
remained oriented to the content and methods of natural research.
So, even though scholars like Lichtenberg and Schlo¨zer sometimes used
seemingly modern labels such as “physics” and “history,” these labels had
different meanings than today. Furthermore, even though these scholars
36. Martin Gierl, “Change of Paradigm as a Squabble between Institutions,” in Scholars in
Action: The Practice of Knowledge and the Figure of the Savant in the 18th Century, ed. Andre´
Holenstein, Hubert Steinke, and Martin Stuber (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 286–87.
37. Stichweh, Zur Entstehung wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen (ref. 11), 14–38.
38. Schlo¨zer’s use of tables has been identified as “data-driven” practice in the context of his
work as a statistician, which illustrates his multilateral profile as a researcher. David Sepkoski and
Marco Tamborini, “‘An Image of Science’: Cameralism, Statistics, and the Visual Language of
Natural History in the Nineteenth Century,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 48, no. 1
(2018): 56–109, on 68; Christine von Oertzen, “Datafication and Spatial Visualization in
Nineteenth-Century Census Statistics,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 48, no. 5 (2018):
568–80, on 570.
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played significant roles in the differentiation of physics and history, they were
not part of disciplinary frameworks. Their use and interpretation of the cate-
gory of fact, which corresponded on crucial points, reveals the strong connec-
tion between the scholarly ideals and practices of the “physicist” Lichtenberg
and the “historian” Schlo¨zer.
FACTS IN THE GO¨TTINGEN SCHOOL OF HISTORY
August Ludwig Schlo¨zer and Johann Christoph Gattterer have been portrayed
as founding figures of German professional historiography.39 Both aimed to free
historical study from the burden of law and theology by claiming an indepen-
dent place for the field in the philosophical faculty of Go¨ttingen’s university.
Furthermore, they promoted their enterprise in the public sphere.40
The methodologies of Gatterer and Schlo¨zer converged on many points.
They differed, however, in what they considered the basic units of universal
history. For Gatterer, these were “events” (Begebenheiten). In 1792, for exam-
ple, he argued that “events are the actual subject matter of history: from the
immense quantity of them, one selects the most remarkable, proves their
reality from the sources, and narrates them in relation to one another.”41
Schlo¨zer agreed with Gatterer that real events could be building blocks of
sound historical research. However, he specified the units of history beyond
a mere event by introducing the concept of fact. This innovation enabled
Schlo¨zer to label non-events like “the kings of Mycenae,” together with events
such as the arrival of pepper in Europe and the Battle of Carchemisch, as the
basic units of history. These were all facts.42 On many occasions, Schlo¨zer used
“events” and “facts” interchangeably.
39. Peter H. Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975); Martin Peters, Altes Reich und Europa: der Historiker, Statistiker und Publizist
August Ludwig (v.) Schlo¨zer (1735–1809) (Mu¨nster: LIT Verlag, 2003); Martin Gierl, Geschichte als
pra¨zisierte Wissenschaft: Johann Christoph Gatterer und die Historiographie des 18. Jahrhunderts im
ganzen Umfang, Fundamenta Historica, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2012).
40. Schlo¨zer’s lectures at the University of Go¨ttingen attracted hundreds of students, and his
periodic journals were read by thousands. Justin Stagl, A History of Curiosity (Chur: Harwood,
1995), 246.
41. As quoted by Claudia Schrapel, Johann Dominicus Fiorillo (Zu¨rich: Hildesheim,
2004), 175.
42. August L. Schlo¨zer, Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie, vol. 2 (Go¨ttingen/Gotha,
1773), 253.
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In the first edition of Schlo¨zer’s Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie (1772),
he argued that the aim of universal history, or world history (Weltgeschichte),
was to present as many facts as possible and to present them in relation to one
another: “the best world history is the one that contains the most expediently
selected [Facta].”43 The more facts a historical work presented, the better,
Schlo¨zer claimed. But he also believed that one should not stick to the mere
collection of facts: “The best method of world history is the one that makes it
easiest for its student to understand the coherence of all these [Factorum].”44
Schlo¨zer cherished the Enlightenment ideals of universality: he aimed to pres-
ent a unified history of humanity, spanning all centuries and continents, and
connecting the past to the present.45 In order to reach such a universal picture,
Schlo¨zer declared it to be the ultimate aim of history to combine and to
organize facts “synthetically.”46 For this, Schlo¨zer used tables, which ordered
relevant historical facts either according to time period or according to people
(Fig. 2).47 Following Schlo¨zer, the collection of self-explanatory facts or events
formed the empirical and certain basis of historical science, whereas only the
ordering of them could lead to divergent pictures. To illustrate this, Schlo¨zer
drew a parallel with mosaic artists, who can build entirely different portraits
from the very same collection of stones.48
Schlo¨zer used different words to denote the concept of fact throughout his
oeuvre. In the 1773 reissue of Schlo¨zer’s Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie, he
argued that the terms Begebenheit and factum were unfitting as the basic units of
history. Hence, he proposed a new term: Thatsatz. He justified this linguistic
innovation as follows: “May I use [Thatsatz] rather than the alien and inflexible
[factum historicum]? [Begebenheit] does not always fit. In general, one must not
avoid a little bit of neology if world history is to be presented [scientifisch].”49
Alas, Schlo¨zer did not further define his neologism; the precise meaning of
Thatsatz follows only implicitly from his writings. Possibly, Schlo¨zer proposed
43. August L. Schlo¨zer, Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie, vol. 1 (Go¨ttingen/Gotha, 1772), 45.
44. Ibid., 45.
45. Ibid., 4.
46. Ibid., 96–98.
47. Schlo¨zer’s work contained “synchronistic” tables (ibid., 89–93) and “ethnographic” tables
(ibid. 109–10). He argued that such tables form the basis of universal history: Schlo¨zer, Vor-
stellung, vol. 2 (ref. 42), 248. On the use of tables in early modern historiography and their
relation to facts: Benjamin Steiner, Die Ordnung der Geschichte: Historische Tabellenwerke in der
Fru¨hen Neuzeit (Ko¨ln: Bo¨hlau Verlag, 2008), ff. 236.
48. Schlo¨zer, Vorstellung, vol. 2 (ref. 42), 254.
49. Ibid., 235 (footnote).
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the term (which may be translated as “factual proposition”) to justify that the
basic units of his universal history were often generalizations rather than indi-
vidual events. Nonetheless, Schlo¨zer’s introduction of the novel term Thatsatz,
which was never broadly adopted, underlines the ambiguities surrounding the
concept of fact in the German context around 1800. In later writings, Schlo¨zer
alternately used the terms Factum, Tatsatz, Tatsache (both now without an “h”),
as well as their plurals, in his description of proper historical method.50 It seems
FIG. 2. Schlo¨zer’s fact-ordering tables.
A fragment of one of Schlo¨zer’s synchronistische
Tabellen, ordering historical facts synthetically,
according to time period. Source: Schlo¨zer,
Vorstellung 1 (ref. 43), 89, from Niedersa¨chsische
Staats- und Universita¨tsbibliothek Go¨ttingen,
8 H UN II, 510:1 RARA.
50. In 1785, Schlo¨zer distinguished between three different roles in historical practice, using
Faktum, Tatsatz, and Tatsache interchangeably: the GeschichtSammler collects as many facts as
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that Schlo¨zer eventually considered these terms as synonyms, but it is difficult
to determine at what point Schlo¨zer adopted which one, and whether he
interpreted them differently or not.
Against Speculative History
Schlo¨zer’s fact-based epistemology matched a broader empirical turn among
Go¨ttingen scholars. This turn was rooted in philological practice, particularly
in the philological method of source criticism, which was practiced in the
Go¨ttingen philological seminar.51 Because many history students attended,
the seminar played a prominent role in making philological method a key part
of historical practice. Until 1763, this successful teaching institute was being led
by the theologically inclined scholar Johann David Michaelis (1717–1791). For
Michaelis, who was Schlo¨zer’s mentor,52 proper empirical history required
knowledge of the facts. When Michaelis referred to facts, he emphasized, like
Schlo¨zer, that they were found in manuscripts and that they stood in sharp
contrast with conjectures.53
Despite internal struggles, the Go¨ttingen School’s representatives, including
historically minded philologists like Michaelis and philologically minded his-
torians like Schlo¨zer, collectively opposed speculative historiography, which
they perceived as a threat to their empiricism. From the 1770s onward, they did
so by insisting on the importance of facts and the associated method of source
criticism. Their arrows were mostly aimed at French historians. For example,
Schlo¨zer at one point proclaimed that “critical method digs up the [Facta] from
annals and monuments one by one (the Voltaires make them themselves, or at
least color them).”54
-
possible from historical manuscripts, the GeschichtForscher critically investigates their authenticity,
and the GeschichtSchreiber oversees all available and critically examined facts, and draws from them
only the most relevant ones. August L. Schlo¨zer, “Schlo¨zer u¨ber die Geschichtsverfassung,” in
Theoretiker der deutschen Aufkla¨rungshistorie, Fudamenta Historica 1.2, vol. 2, ed. Horst W. Blanke
and Dirk Fleischer (Stuttgart: Fromman-Holzboog, 1990), 590–99.
51.William Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 141–82.
52. Reill, Rise of Historicism (ref. 39), 84.
53. Johann D. Michaelis, Einleitung in die go¨ttlichen Schriften des Neuen Bundes, 4th ed., vol. 1,
(Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoek, 1788), 574 and 794.
54. Schlo¨zer, Vorstellung, vol. 1 (ref. 43), 45. On Gatterer and Schlo¨zer’s distaste for French
historiography, see Reill, Rise of Historicism (ref. 39), 36–37.
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Schlo¨zer’s polemic rhetoric was not only aimed at the French, but also at
a prominent, German-speaking contemporary: Johann Gottfried Herder
(1744–1803). In the beginning of the 1770s, Schlo¨zer and Herder engaged in
a fierce conflict about the proper historical method. The reason for the intel-
lectual dispute had been a scathing review of Schlo¨zer’s 1772 Universal-Historie
written by Herder in that same year.55 The 1773 reissue of Schlo¨zer’sUniversal-
Historie was written as a direct response to Herder’s review. Here, Schlo¨zer
blamed Herder for a lack of interest in “facts,” distinguishing his own work
from Herder’s Schmuck. According to Schlo¨zer, Herder, much unlike a proper
historian, cared not about the facts themselves, but only about displaying them
as gracefully as possible.56
Herder, in turn, disagreed not so much with Schlo¨zer’s emphasis on the
importance of facts, but especially with his dedication to Universal-Historie,
which was built on the assumptions of historical progress and universality.
Herder rejected these assumptions, and insisted on contextualization and the
principle of individuality instead.57 All the same, Herder eventually buried the
hatchet. In 1798, he even wrote an acclaiming review of one of Schlo¨zer’s later
works, praising it for being “a book that develops and presents its merits from
[Thatsachen].”58 Herder’s compliment illustrates that the standpoint that facts
were the units of history had become increasingly common toward the end of
the eighteenth century.
A Blend of Human and Natural Study
I argued before that, despite early dynamics of disciplinary differentiation,
research into natural and human history remained closely intertwined in
Go¨ttingen, at least until the late eighteenth century.59 Schlo¨zer and Gatterer
commonly expressed the view that natural and human history formed
55. The review was published on 28 July: Johann G. Herder, review of Vorstellung seiner
Universal Historie, by August L. Schlo¨zer, Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen 60 (1772): 473–78. For
more context, see: Justin Stagl, “Rationalism and Irrationalism in Early German Ethnology: The
Controversy between Schlo¨zer and Herder, 1772/73,” Anthropos, 93, no. 4 (1998): 521–36.
56. Schlo¨zer, Vorstellung, vol. 2 (ref. 42), 384.
57. Beiser, Historicist Tradition (ref. 13), 98–166.
58. As quoted by Peters, Schlo¨zer (ref. 39), 404.
59. Historian of science John Heilbron has typified the prevalent spirit at the university as
“a blend of history and natural science.” John L. Heilbron, “Physics and Its History at Go¨ttingen
around 1800,” in Go¨ttingen and the Development of the Natural Sciences, ed. Nicolaas A. Rupke
(Go¨ttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002), 50–71, on 67.
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a whole. For example, they both took the Linnaean classification system of
natural history as a reference point while developing methods to order facts
or events systematically.60
Sometimes, Go¨ttingen historians and naturalists were involved in the very
same intellectual projects. In the 1790s, Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752–1827)
initiated a laborious enterprise called the Geschichte der Ku¨nste und Wissenschaf-
ten, which appeared in 61 volumes between 1796 and 1820.61 The relevance of
the Geschichte to this study lies in its exemplarity for the general blend of
historical and natural study in Go¨ttingen at the time. Involved in Eichhorn’s
project were Johann Friedrich Gmelin (1748–1804), who occupied a chair in
chemistry in Go¨ttingen, and Johann Carl Fischer (1760–1833), who taught
mathematics and physics at the University of Jena, but who had also been
a history student of Gatterer.62
The Geschichte is also a relevant source because it propagated a fact-based
epistemology. In an introductory volume, Eichhorn argued that “the historian
should stick to [Facta] and let them speak for themselves . . . in my opinion,
any other approach is not history itself, but its use for predetermined
purposes.”63 Thus, in Eichhorn’s view, facts could speak for themselves, and
historians should let them. Even though this attitude indicates a renewed
interpretation of the role of facts as compared to Schlo¨zer’s, who encouraged
historians not to let facts speak for themselves but to arrange them in unified
systems, Eichhorn’s words should not be taken too literally. In practice, he
adhered to the same universalist spirit as his Go¨ttingen colleagues.64
To sum up, I have pointed out how the term “fact” was used by the
members of the Go¨ttingen School. In Schlo¨zer’s work, a fact referred either
directly to an event, such as a battle, or to a proposition based upon a range of
events, such as a list of kings from a certain era. In the final decades of the
eighteenth century, critically examined facts, as extracted from manuscripts,
60. On Schlo¨zer’s intellectual and personal relation with Linneaus: Stagl, “The Controversy
between Schlo¨zer and Herder” (ref. 55), 528. On Gatterer’s inclinations toward natural history:
Martin Gierl, “Das Alphabet der Natur und das Alphabet der Kultur im 18. Jahrhundert,” NTM
Zeitschrift fu¨r Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 18, no. 1 (2010): 1–27.
61. Schrapel, Johann Dominicus Fiorillo (ref. 41), 184–99.
62. Van Miert, “The Go¨ttingen Geschichte” (ref. 34), 400, presents a table with a full
overview of the volumes published under the banner of Eichhorn’s project. On J. C. Fischer’s
career and contribution, see Heilbron, “Physics and Its History” (ref. 59), 55–59.
63. Johann G. Eichhorn, Allgemeine Geschichte der Cultur und Litteratur des neueren Europas
(Go¨ttingen: 1796–1799), lxxxii.
64. Van Miert, “The Go¨ttingen Geschichte” (ref. 34), 397.
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came to be considered as the basic units of proper, empirical historiography.
Still, the ultimate goal of the new fact-oriented empiricism among the
members of the Go¨ttingen School remained to construct a system of facts,
analogous to that of Linnaeus.
FACTS IN LICHTENBERG’S EXPERIMENTAL NATURLEHRE
Parallel to the increasing popularity of the concept of fact among the members
of the Go¨ttingen School, another of the university’s most distinguished scho-
lars, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, adopted it to express his views on the
method of experimental physics.
Lichtenberg was professor of physics in Go¨ttingen between 1770 and 1799.
He was the teacher of famous German scholars such as Alexander von Hum-
boldt (1769–1859) and Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777–1855), and the editor of four
widely read and highly influential textbooks on physics published between
1784 and 1794, which were updated editions of Johann Polycarp Erxleben’s
(1744–1777) Anfangsgru¨nde der Naturlehre (1772). According to William
Clark, Lichtenberg’s Anfangsgru¨nde became so popular that, in the final dec-
ades of the eighteenth century, “virtually everyone who taught at a German-
language university used the work,” including Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).65
As a result, Lichtenberg strongly influenced the future generation of Ger-
man physicists.
Indeed, Lichtenberg was a crucial figure in establishing unity and continuity
within the emerging discipline of physics in Germany.66 Lichtenberg’s text-
books and lectures updated the German learned community about the latest
international advancements, but also established standards of experimentation
and epistemology.67 In 1790, Alexander von Humboldt praised him for this
after attending his lectures in previous years: “I regard not simply the sum of
positive knowledge that I gained from your lectures—but still more the general
65. William Clark, “From Enlightenment to Romanticism: Lichtenberg and Go¨ttingen
Physics,” in Rupke, Go¨ttingen Natural Science (ref. 59), 72–85, on 74–75.
66. Claire Baldwin, “Performance and Play: Lichtenberg’s Lectures on Experimental Physics,”
in Performing Knowledge, 1750–1850, ed. Mary Helen Dupree and Sean B. Franzel (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 2015), 193–220, on 210–11.
67. Steven Tester, “Nature, Knowledge, and Scientific Theories in GC Lichtenberg’s Re-
flections on Physics,” HOPOS 6, no. 2 (2016): 185–211, on 194.
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direction that my course of thought took under your guidance. Truth is
valuable in itself, but more valuable still is the skill to find it.”68
On the one hand, Lichtenberg, like Gatterer and Schlo¨zer, was a discipline
builder, since he did much to increase the status of Experimentalphysik in
German intellectual culture. On the other hand, Lichtenberg, like his collea-
gues, constantly moved across the not so firmly established boundaries between
historical and natural study.69 Lichtenberg had been a student of Gatterer in the
1760s, he was an active member of his Historical Institute, and he contributed
to Eichhorn’s Geschichte with an extensive biography of Copernicus.70 Lichten-
berg thus not only appreciated historical craftsmanship, but practiced it himself.
His acclaimed aphorisms, collected in the famous Sudelbu¨cher, contain many
remarks on the proper methods of historiography. Last but not least, Lichten-
berg encouraged his fellow naturalists to engage in the history of their fields, and
his historical awareness developed to such an extent that he formulated a the-
oretical perspective on revolutions in science.71
Thus, Lichtenberg shared more than a university with Gatterer and Schlo¨-
zer. Their scholarly enterprises crucially overlapped. Furthermore, they drew
upon a similar conceptual repertoire, which came to include the concept of
fact from the 1770s onward. This becomes evident from letters circulating
between Lichtenberg, Schlo¨zer, and other prominent Go¨ttingen academics,
such as Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840). In 1797, Lichtenberg
shared a recent publication with Blumenbach, which he recommended as
follows: “I would not have offered it to you, had I not been assured by
a reputable source that it contains only [Thatsachen] (or, according to Schlo¨-
zer, [Tatsachen]).”72 Apart from showing that Go¨ttingen academics from
different fields used similar epistemological language, this fragment also in-
dicates that there were different views on the proper spelling of T(h)atsachen
(Schlo¨zer’s Thatsatz was not even mentioned here). This again illustrates the
68. As quoted by Baldwin, “Lichtenberg’s Lectures” (ref. 66), 209.
69. This has enticed some to portray Lichtenberg, somewhat anachronistically, as
a “humanist-scientist”: Franz H. Mautner and Franklin Miller Jr., “Remarks on GC Lichtenberg,
Humanist-Scientist,” Isis 43, no. 3 (1952): 223–31.
70. Lothar Kolmer, “G. Ch. Lichtenberg als Geschichtsschreiber,” Archiv fu¨r Kulturgeschichte
65, no. 2 (1983): 371–416.
71. I. Bernard Cohen, Revolution in Science (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1985), 225 and 517–19.
72. Ulrich Joost and Albrecht Scho¨ne, eds., Lichtenberg: Briefwechsel, vol. 4 (Munich: C.H.
Beck, 1992), 1025.
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terminological complexity so characteristic of the early history of the concept
of fact in the German language.
Facts Versus Theories
Like Schlo¨zer, Lichtenberg began to use the concept of fact in his writings from
the late eighteenth century onward. In his textbooks onNaturlehre, Thatsachen
came to replace Begebenheiten.73 Yet, facts were less prominent in Lichten-
berg’s work than in Schlo¨zer’s. This was true with regard to German Natur-
lehre in general. Johann Samuel Traugott Gehler’s (1751–1795) popular late-
eighteenth-century Physikalisches Wo¨rterbuch,74 for example, contained para-
graphs on Beobachtung, Erfahrung, and Hypothese, but not on Factum or
Thatsache. Despite the relatively minor role of the fact in this period, it is still
important to examine interpretations of the concept that were prevalent then,
since these predetermined those of nineteenth-century German physicists.
Lichtenberg generally considered facts as true, fixed, and impersonal infer-
ences from multiple observations or experiences. Yet, Lichtenberg’s conception
of factuality was somewhat ambiguous; he never defined what exactly he meant
by a fact. Like his Go¨ttingen colleagues writing history, Lichtenberg criticized
speculative approaches, while strongly advocating an empiricist epistemol-
ogy.75 Lichtenberg’s use of the concept of fact fitted his empiricism. For
example, he admonished his fellow scholars to be careful not to be seduced
by unfounded ideas, but to be guided by facts. “Men are for the most part such
reckless observers,” Lichtenberg argued, “that a philosopher can never be
careful enough when he wishes to use their stories of extraordinary incidents.
He should never formulate any hypotheses on the basis of anything other than
clear [Thatsachen] and experiments, if he does not want to run the risk of
seeing them collapse like a house of cards.”76
Like Schlo¨zer, Lichtenberg thus maintained that the basis of proper
Wissenschaft concerned the compilation of facts. The parallels between
73. Lichtenberg’s predecessor, Erxleben, did not use the term “fact” to conceptualize the
empirical basis of physics. Rather, he used the term Naturbegebenheiten (natural events). Johann
C. P. Erxleben, Anfangsgru¨nde der Naturlehre (Go¨ttingen/Gotha, 1772), 4.
74. Johann S. T. Gehler, Physikalisches Wo¨rterbu¨ch, oder, Versuch einer Erkla¨rung der vor-
nehmsten Begriffe und Kunstwo¨rter der Naturlehre, 6 vols., (Leipzig, 1787–1796).
75. Tester, “Lichtenberg’s Reflections on Physics” (ref. 67), 189.
76. Wiard Hinrichs, Albert Krayer, and Horst Zehe, eds., Lichtenbergs annotiertes Handex-
emplar der vierten Auflage von Johann Christian Polykarp Erxleben: “Anfangsgru¨nde der Nat-
urlehre” (Go¨ttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005), 801.
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Lichtenberg’s ideas on the methods of Naturlehre and Schlo¨zer’s on those of
Universal-Historie are further evident when considering that Lichtenberg
encouraged his peers not only to collect individual facts, but also to connect
different facts with one another. As he explained in his lecture notes: “it is
useless to find facts, when one does not try to bring them in relation to one
another. We must certainly have [Thatsachen], since they are the basis of
[Wissenschaft], but they are not [Wissenschaft] itself.”77 For Lichtenberg,
thus, empirical facts were the basic elements of science, but they always
should be followed by synthesis. It seems that Lichtenberg believed that this
could be done without using theory.
Indeed, Lichtenberg was as devoted to observation as he was suspicious of
theory. He proposed in “textbooks no longer to use the word [Theorie] in the
sections on fire, electricity, and magnetism . . . but rather [Facta] and con-
jectures.”78 Lichtenberg’s emphasis on the empirical basis ofPhysik can be under-
stood in relation to his reputation of a careful and skilled experimenter.79 When
publishing about his experiments, Lichtenberg took great pains to stay true to his
ideal of theory-free description. AsWilliamClark has pointed out, Lichtenberg in
his publications claimed that “his intent was not to defend any particular theo-
ry . . . theory-neutral, phenomenal description remained the goal of physics.”80
An important influence on Lichtenberg’s experimentalism was the Genevan
naturalist and instrument-maker Jean-Andre´ Deluc (1727–1817). Lichtenberg’s
writings contained lots of references to Deluc’s work, and the two corresponded
frequently.81 Deluc and Lichtenberg shared a passion for instruments, exper-
iment, and for facts (Deluc, who usually wrote in French, used the word fait).82
On multiple occasions, Lichtenberg declared his solidarity with Deluc’s posi-
tion that proper Physik must be grounded in empirically acquired and eternally
77. Albert Krayer and Thomas Nickol, eds., Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: Vorlesungen zur
Naturlehre. Notizen und Materialen zur Astronomie und Physischen Geographie (Go¨ttingen:
Wallstein Verlag, 2013), 500.
78. As translated and quoted by Clark, “Lichtenberg and Go¨ttingen Physics” (ref. 65), 77.
79. Mautner and Miller, “Humanist-Scientist” (ref. 69), 225.
80. Clark, “Lichtenberg and Go¨ttingen Physics” (ref. 65), 77. Lichtenberg’s “agnostic
position” with regard to theory is also discussed in: Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, “Lichtenberg und
die Franzo¨sische Revolution: Zum Verha¨ltnis von Sprache, Naturwissenschaft und Aufkla¨rung”
(PhD dissertation, The University of British Columbia, 1991), 105.
81. Heilbron, “Physics and Its History” (ref. 59), 61.
82. The increasing interest in and presence of measuring instruments in Germany in the late
eighteenth century cannot be seen separately from parallel technological developments. For
a balanced view on this issue, see: Klein, Humboldts Preußen (ref. 15).
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valid facts.83 Lichtenberg praised Deluc’s work because it contained “an excel-
lent collection of facts” and because it had nothing to do with theoretical
dreams: “DeLuc’s system shall be guided by undeniable [Fackta], while all the
others are lost in dreams, the one less absurd than the other, and among which
the Kantian seems to me to be the most beautiful.”84
Here, Lichtenberg mentions another influence on him, namely Kant.
Although Lichtenberg was influenced by Kantian philosophy to a reasonable
extent, their interpretation of the concept of fact was at odds. Unlike Lich-
tenberg, Kant thought that it was possible to extend the concept of fact from
the realm of experience to the realm of reason.85 In 1790, Kant declared:
“I extend the concept of a [Thatsache] beyond the usual meaning of this word
[because] it is not necessary, indeed not even feasible, to restrict this expres-
sion merely to actual experience.”86 Ultimately, this led Kant to define
Thatsachen as “objects for concepts the objective reality of which can be
proved . . .whether through pure reason or through experience.”87 The lack
of agreement between Kant’s and Lichtenberg’s understanding of a fact un-
derlines once again that different interpretations of the concept coexisted in
the German context around 1800.
Eternal Facts and Revolutions
Albeit not Kantian, Lichtenberg’s division between fact and theory was char-
acteristic of his time. I have stressed that Lichtenberg’s vocabulary resonated
with the one employed by the Go¨ttingen School. His views on factuality
mirrored those of other German naturalists as well. Lichtenberg’s contem-
poraries generally emphasized the fragile nature of a theoretical “building”
(Lehrgeba¨ude), while stressing the eternal value of facts. For example, Lich-
tenberg’s former student Alexander von Humboldt wrote to Blumenbach in
1795 that “[Thatsachen] are fixed when the fleetingly improvised theoretical
83. Horst Zehe, Albert Krayer, and Wiard Hinrichs, eds., Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: Vorle-
sungen zur Naturlehre. Notizen und Materialen zur Experimentalphysik, Teil 1 (Go¨ttingen: Wallstein
Verlag, 2007), 674.
84. Krayer and Nickol, Lichtenberg: Vorlesungen zur Naturlehre (ref. 77), 384.
85. Barbara Cassin, Emily S. Apter, Jacques Lezra, Steven Rendall, and Michael Wood, eds.,
Dictionary of untranslatables: A philosophical lexicon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2014), 1113–17.
86. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, eds., Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 332 (footnote).
87. Ibid.
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[Lehrgeba¨ude] has long collapsed.” For this reason, Humboldt, like his
teacher Lichtenberg, argued for a stringent separation between fact and con-
jecture: “I shall separate the [Thatsachen] themselves from my conjectures.
This way of treating natural phenomena to me seems the most fertile and
sound.”88 In Gehler’s dictionary, the value of facts was stressed in terms of
a building metaphor as well: “the unprejudiced naturalist must not forget that
a single [Thatsache] has more truth value than the artificial structure of
explanations.”89
The contrast evoked between a shaky theoretical “building,” which could
be torn down, and eternal facts, which could not, might be interpreted as
a sign of the times. The decades around 1800 were shaped by deep social and
political shifts, as exemplified by the French revolution. In German Natur-
lehre around 1800, the opposition between fact and theory was mostly
referred to in the context of debates about yet another revolution with
French origins, namely Lavoisier’s introduction of anti-phlogistic chemistry.
In Go¨ttingen, attitudes toward the new chemistry and French revolutionary
politics were generally dismissive.90
In the 1790s, Lichtenberg often called attention to the parallels between
French revolutionary chemistry and politics. As Geoffrey Winthrop-Young has
argued, the French Revolution “appeared to him primarily as a war of words
and signs.”91 Likewise, Lichtenberg disregarded Lavoisier’s “system” for its
“funny nomenclatures . . . that do not express [Thatsachen], but opinions.”92
Lichtenberg’s friend Deluc, who resented French science in general, even went
as far as to claim that the objectionable French political revolution had its roots
in the new theoretical system of anti-phlogistic chemistry. On November 18,
1793, he wrote to Lichtenberg that “this French quest for domination began,
I say, with chemistry. There we must demolish their edifice, because there we
can demonstrate . . . the truth.”93
With the aversion toward the French came an increased appreciation of
English natural philosophy, particularly the kind represented by Francis Bacon
(1561–1626). In Bacon, Lichtenberg and his fellow empiricists found a common
88. Alexander von Humboldt, “Ueber die gereizte Muskelfaser, aus einem Briefe an Herrn
Hofrath Blumenbach,” Neues Journal der Physik 2 (1795): 115–29, on 127.
89. Gehler, Physikalisches Wo¨rterbuch (ref. 74), vol. 2, 678.
90. Heilbron, “Physics and Its History” (ref. 59), 61–65.
91. Winthrop-Young, “Lichtenberg und die Revolution” (ref. 80), ii.
92. As quoted in ibid., 137.
93. Heilbron, “Physics and Its History” (ref. 59), 65.
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enemy of speculative systems and theories, and a prominent proponent of
empirical facts.94 In Johann Fischer’s Geschichte der Physik, for example, Bacon
was portrayed as “the first to show the true way,” whereas Descartes and his
followers were blamed for “wander[ing] from the true path of experience.”95
Alexander von Humboldt propagated Bacon as the one and only founder of
modern experimentalism, as well. According to historian Michael Dettelbach,
Humboldt’s turn to Baconianism in the late eighteenth century was motivated
by his “hostility toward theory,” and his “faith in the positivity and indepen-
dence of mere facts.”96 Given Bacon’s crucial role in establishing the concept
of fact in English natural philosophy,97 the establishment of this English-
German connection in the final decades of the eighteenth century cannot be
seen separately from the increasing momentum of the concept of fact in the
German context.98
Apart from the English influence, it is likely that the crumbling status of
phlogiston theory, as well as the historical projects Lichtenberg and his Go¨t-
tingen naturalist colleagues were involved in, made them very much aware of
the temporary character of theories. Acknowledging these backgrounds, we can
appreciate their desire for lasting, empirical knowledge. Hence, German nat-
uralists like Lichtenberg, Gehler, and Humboldt stressed the eternal character
of facts, and opposed them to temporary and fallible theoretical “buildings”
and hypotheses. They regarded factual knowledge as true and eternal and in
contrast to theory.99
Did similar reasons motivate the embrace of facts by Schlo¨zer and the other
members of the Go¨ttingen School? It is certain that they shared Lichtenberg’s
aversion to nonfactual systems. Like Lichtenberg, they considered such
94. Clark, “Lichtenberg and Go¨ttingen Physics” (ref. 65), 80.
95. As quoted by Heilbron, “Physics and Its History” (ref. 59), 59.
96. Michael Dettelbach, “‘Baconianism’ in Revolutionary Germany: Humboldt’s ‘Great
Instauration’,” in The Skeptical Tradition Around 1800, ed. Johan van der Zande and Richard H.
Popkin (Dordrecht: Springer, 1998), 175–86, on 178.
97. Shapiro, Culture of Fact (ref. 3); Daston, “Baconsche Tatsachen” (ref. 23).
98. David Simpson has explored the links between what he calls the English “revolt against
theory” and contemporary nationalist discourse in the wake of the French revolution. David
Simpson, Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt Against Theory (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1993).
99. A study of German chemistry textbooks around 1800 underlines this interpretation of the
of fact as eternal: Jan Frercks and Michael Markert, “The Invention of Theoretische Chemie:
Forms and Uses of German Chemistry Textbooks, 1775–1820,” Ambix 54, no. 2 (2007): 146–71,
on 155. Also Frercks, “Facticity of Facts” (ref. 3).
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systems characteristic of French knowledge culture in particular. Indeed, the
members of the Go¨ttingen School shared Lichtenberg’s rejection of French
scholarship and his distaste for revolutions, particularly the French.100 It thus
seems plausible that Schlo¨zer’s emphasis on facts, like Lichtenberg’s, related to
the political context of the French Revolution. That said, the advent of anti-
phlogistic chemistry seems not to have played a direct role in the Go¨ttingen
School’s embrace of factuality, despite the commitment of the members of this
school to natural study. First and foremost, the parallel emergence of a culture
of fact inUniversal-Historie andNaturlehre in Go¨ttingen was part of a common
struggle against hitherto dominant, rationalist methods.
BEFORE DISCIPLINES: THE FACT AS A HISTORICAL CONCEPT
The functions and increasing importance of the concept of fact in late-
eighteenth-century Go¨ttingen are better understood when seen in relation to
the then-dominant classifications of knowledge. I have shown that although
dynamics of differentiation developed in this context, it would be mistaken to
suppose that there were strict disciplinary boundaries. Indeed, historical and
natural study remained intertwined in the ideals and practices of Go¨ttingen
scholars. In fact, the boundaries between historical and natural research were
still blurred in Germany generally.
This conformed to the classification of knowledge propagated by Christian
Wolff, which remained dominant in German intellectual culture far into the
eighteenth century. Wolff and his many followers did not consider “history” as
an independent field of knowledge, but as providing the empirical basis for
rational science. In their model, history comprised both human and natural
knowledge.101 This scheme was still endorsed by Kant, who characterized
experimental physics as “historical,” and attributed to it only a precursory role
in rational, mathematical knowledge. For Kant, the value of historical or empir-
ical knowledge lay in its creation of “the objects of rational knowledge.”102
According to Wolff and Kant, historical or empirical knowledge was thus
100. Reill, Rise of Historicism (ref. 39), 8.
101. Arno Seifert, Cognitio Historica: Die Geschichte als Namengeberin der fru¨hneuzeitlichen
Empirie (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1976), 163–78. Gianna Pomata and Nancy G. Siraisi,
eds., Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2005).
102. As quoted by Seifert, Cognitio Historica (ref. 101), 185–86.
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positioned hierarchically belowmathematics and philosophy.103 For a significant
part of the eighteenth century, the historical and the empirical were thus under-
stood equivalent. But they were not regarded as wissenschaftlich. Only philoso-
phy and mathematics were considered Wissenschaft, as the methods of both
enabled explanation. History, on the other hand, merely had to do with the
recognition, description, and ordering of individual events and observations.
I have argued above that the objects of historical knowledge were increasingly
often labelled as facts (Facta, Thatsachen, or Tatsa¨tze) rather than events (Bege-
benheiten) toward the end of the eighteenth century. In German learned culture,
facts appeared regularly first in texts on the foundations of theological history,
somewhat later in the Go¨ttingen tradition of Universal-Historie, and not long
thereafter in the historical subject of Experimentalphysik. In late-eighteenth-
century German intellectual culture, the concept of fact thus developed as part
of a historical repertoire, which comprised both human and natural study.
As historical knowledge was considered hierarchically below philosophy and
mathematics, facts were initially considered only the basis of Wissenschaft, but
not Wissenschaft itself. As I have shown above, both Schlo¨zer and Lichtenberg
argued along these lines. These commonalities illustrate the common concep-
tual foundations of German physics and historiography, which would develop
into modern academic disciplines over the course of the nineteenth century.
Evidently, the hierarchical classificatory scheme outlined above differed
fundamentally from the disciplinary classification that emerged in the nine-
teenth century. As Rudolf Stichweh has pointed out, the modern disciplinary
system contained relatively autonomous units rather than hierarchical
layers.104 The evolving disciplinary landscape was “horizontal”: mathematics
and philosophy came to stand on the same hierarchical level as fields of study
that had previously been considered “historical,” including physics and histo-
riography. The context in which this transformation took place was the expan-
sion of the philosophical faculties at German universities, many of which
adopted the Go¨ttingen model of specialization in the decades around 1800.
The structural organization of specialized training in these expanding institu-
tional contexts was a key aspect of the materialization of physics and history as
disciplines.105 Through practical exercises, for example, disciplinary methods
103. Ibid., 163–78.
104. Stichweh, Zur Entstehung wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen (ref. 11), 14–38.
105. This ties in with Rudolf Stichweh’s characterization of a discipline as “knowledge brought
into teachable form.” Ibid., 7.
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were established, refined, and passed on to next generations. Furthermore, the
boundaries of disciplines became more clearly established by the foundation of
institutes, journals, and university chairs.
In this mutating institutional landscape, the concept of fact mutated as well.
As the status of grand theories and systems further crumbled, the status of facts
further increased. After 1800, facts were no longer seen as providing merely the
basis of Wissenschaft. Both physicists and historians began to grant the facts
themselves the status of Wissenschaft.
FACTS AND DISCIPLINE FORMATION
In this section, I trace the history of the concept of fact in contexts of
discipline formation after 1800. I show how facts acquired prominence in
physics and historiography, and how they related to specific teaching and
research practices that came to characterize these disciplines. My main focus
will be on the University of Berlin, which opened in 1810 and was modelled
after the institutional structures of the University of Go¨ttingen.106 Whereas
a German culture of fact first gained a foothold in late-eighteenth-century
Go¨ttingen, it became genuinely visible in early-nineteenth-century Berlin.
Here, an intellectual battle raged between defenders of philosophical, spec-
ulative methods on the one hand, and proponents of empirical, fact-oriented
ones on the other. Simultaneous to these debates, processes of differentiation
and specialization intensified, which sharpened the contours of physics and
history as disciplines.
The Growing Contrast Between Fact and Theory in German Physics
In the first decades after 1800, physics and chemistry remained closely con-
nected.107 Sometimes, both were still regarded as part of Naturlehre. The
general trend, however, was that chemistry differentiated from Naturlehre as
a separate field of study, which made physics something of a residual discipline.
Consequently, physics, which was now often perceived of as a synonym of
106. A lot has been written on the foundation of the University of Berlin, its indebtedness to
Go¨ttingen, and the role of these universities in the formation of modern scientific and humanistic
disciplines. See, e.g.: Stichweh, Sociology of Scientific Disciplines (ref. 35), 9; Chad Wellmon,
Organizing Enlightenment: Information Overload and the Invention of the Modern Research Uni-
versity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 210–33.
107. Stichweh, Zur Entstehung wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen (ref. 11), 94–172.
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Naturlehre, took more of a distinctive shape in the first two decades of the
nineteenth century. In this period, physicists defined their materializing dis-
cipline as a pursuit of facts. A clear-cut example of a physicist employing this
demarcation strategy was Ernst Gottfried Fischer (1754–1831).
Fischer, who had been a private tutor of the Humboldt brothers, became
professor of physics at the University of Berlin right at its foundation in
1810.108 In his Lehrbuch der mechanischen Naturlehre, which first appeared in
1805, Fischer aimed to establish physics, which he labelled mechanische Nat-
urlehre, as a mathematical and empirical discipline based on mechanics.109
Fischer unequivocally embraced the notion of fact in his characterization of
physics and its proper method. In the preface to the second edition of his book,
Fischer accused authors of previously published German textbooks on physics,
including Gehler, of having mixed up facts and hypotheses in their discussion
of Lavoisier’s theory. Subsequently, Fischer defined facts not as the eternal
foundation of an ever-changing scientific Lehrgeba¨ude, which would have been
a common expression in the late eighteenth century, but as the Lehrgeba¨ude
itself: “A well-ordered [Lehrgeba¨ude] of an empirical science,” Fischer stressed,
“can be nothing else than a careful, systematic compilation of [Thatsachen].”
As long as knowledge was grounded in fact, Fischer argued, it could stand the
test of time: “Such a building is established in its essential parts for eternity.
Discoveries can serve to enlarge it or to improve its inner configuration, but
never to destroy it and tear it down.”110 For Fischer, facts were thus empirical,
eternal, and unchangeable building blocks that, in differing combinations,
constituted scientific (wissenschaftliches) knowledge. More precisely, they were
generally valid propositions directly based on empirical observations. For
example, Fischer regarded it “a very common [Thatsache] that every chemical
mixture of two substances produces either heat or cold.”111 Furthermore, he
found it “a well-known [Thatsache]” that “some bodies absorb light, and in the
dark emit it again.”112
108. Klein, Humboldts Preußen (ref. 15), 279. On the political backgrounds of the foundation
of the University of Berlin: e.g., Charles E. McClelland, State, Society, and University in Germany,
1700–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 101–50.
109. References are to the third edition of Fischer’s book from 1827, which includes the
preface to the second edition from 1819. These editions of Fischer’s two-volume book were aimed
to be used in physics instruction at German universities and became very influential. Ernst G.
Fischer, Lehrbuch der mechanischen Naturlehre, 2 vols. (Berlin/Leipzig: G.C. Nauck, 1827).
110. Ibid., vol. 1, xi.
111. Ibid., vol. 1, 208.
112. Ibid., vol. 2., 131.
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Fischer’s emphasis on facts must be understood as a response to certain
trends that he perceived as threatening his emerging discipline.113 To begin
with, Fischer criticized the “dark, unclear, and mystical concepts” of Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1775–1854) anti-Newtonian theory of color, which
Goethe had published in 1810.114 He disregarded Goethe’s theory, because it
failed to relate to mathematics and experiment. According to Fischer, Goethe
ignored the facts. Fischer renounced the contemporary German movement of
Naturphilosophie for similar reasons. He lamented that it “must hide behind
obscure and mystical imaginations everywhere, in order to avert the attacks
from the realm of experience which can be made against it.”115
One of Fischer’s younger colleagues in Berlin, the experimentalist
Heinrich Gustav Magnus (1802–1870), despised the speculative methods of
Naturphilosophie as well. On November 2, 1831, twelve days before the death
of the prominent idealistic philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
(1770–1831), Magnus wrote that he hoped that “Naturphilosophie will go to
the grave together with Hegel.”116 Magnus, like Fischer, proclaimed that
proper physics should be strictly empirical and non-speculative.117 He spread
this faith, for example, by organizing small-scale practical training in his
private physical laboratory in Berlin.118 In 1870, one of Magnus’ many
famous pupils, Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894), characterized him as
an ardent opponent of speculation, and a devotee of facts: “Wherever he
came, he brought forth an abundance of new and often surprising [Thatsa-
chen], which he had carefully and responsibly observed, and integrated in the
great building of Wissenschaft.”119
Thus, both Magnus and Fischer employed the concept of fact to define the
boundaries of their emerging discipline. They believed that physics comprised
113.Dennis L. Sepper,Goethe Contra Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
158–73.
114. Fischer, Lehrbuch (ref. 109), vol. 1, xii.
115. Ibid., vol. 1, xiv.
116. Edvard Hjelt, Aus Jac. Berzelius’ und Gustav Magnus’ Briefwechsel in den Jahren 1828–1847
(Braunschweig: Friedrich Vieweg und Sohn, 1900), 63.
117. H. Gustav Magnus, Festrede auf der Universita¨t zu Berlin am 3. August 1862 gehalten
(Berlin: Ko¨nigliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1862), 24.
118. On the details of Magnus’ laboratory training and its significance for the develop-
ment of German physics: Dieter Hoffmann, ed., Gustav Magnus und sein Haus (Stuttgart:
GNT-Verlag, 1995).
119. Hermann von Helmholtz, “zum Geda¨chtnis an Gustav Magnus,” in Vortra¨ge und Reden
(Braunschweig: F. Vieweg und Sohn, 1884), vol. 2, 33–51, on 49.
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nothing but a constellation of well-established and eternal facts. For Fischer
and Magnus, facts rather than theories had become the core of Wissenschaft.
Such definitions of empirical facts as having value for their own sake appeared
especially from the early nineteenth century onward. These findings endorse
Daston’s assertion that, around 1800, the category of fact underwent a pro-
found transformation. She has argued that “eighteenth-century savants had
revered facts but had believed them to be the alpha, not the omega, of scientific
achievement,” whereas nineteenth century scientists held pure facts to be “the
last, best hope for permanence in scientitic achievement.”120 Based on the
above, one might add to Daston’s analysis that, even though such opinions
were indeed rare among German savants before 1800, their interpretation of
facts as eternal and in opposition to theory was a precondition for the enhanced
status of facts in the early nineteenth century.
While Berlin physicists Fischer and Magnus demarcated their field from
philosophy, the ties between physics and mathematics were becoming stron-
ger. The mathematization of German physics over the course of the nineteenth
century further anchored the opposition between fact and theory. The Ko¨nigs-
berg seminar for physics, which was founded in 1834 by Franz Ernst Neumann
(1798–1895), played a leading role in this development.121
Inspired by astronomer Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel’s (1784–1846) work on
probability calculus, Neumann trained his seminar students to balance
between mathematical theory and experiment by teaching them how to quan-
tify measurement error.122 Bessel’s epistemology influenced Neumann as well.
In Bessel’s view, experiment-based mathematical theories in physics could
never be true, but only probable. In an 1838 lecture on probability calculus,
Bessel claimed that “any science inferring from experience to theory begins
with observations, then learns from probability theory in order to employ
and to utilize these observations, and in that way eventually derives the
most probable theory.”123 Bessel thus insisted that physical theories and
120. Lorraine Daston, “Fear and Loathing of the Imagination in Science,” Daedelus 127, no. 1
(1998): 73–95, on 90.
121. Kathryn M. Olesko, Physics as a Calling: Discipline and Practice in the Ko¨nigsberg Seminar
for Physics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Stichweh, Zur Entstehung wissenschaft-
licher Disziplinen (ref. 11), 367–70.
122. Neumann recommended Ernst Fischer’s textbook as preparatory reading material for his
seminar. Olesko, Physics as a Calling (ref. 121), 156–57.
123. Friedrich W. Bessel, “Ueber Wahrscheinlichkeits-Rechnung,” in Popula¨re Vorlesungen
u¨ber wissenschaftliche Gegensta¨nde, ed. Heinrich C. Schumacher (Hamburg: Perthes-Besser &
Mauke, 1848), 387–407, on 406.
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experimental results should never be considered true. But he stuck to a defini-
tion of facts as true and unchangeable, equating them with mathematical
truths.124 Neumann and his seminar students embraced Bessel’s insight that
experimental error was fundamentally unavoidable. Hence, they maintained
that, unlike in pure mathematics, absolute truth could never be fully achieved
in experimental settings.125 In 1850, Neumann declared he aimed to teach
students in his seminar how “to identify in the physical [Thatsachen] those
aspects that allow for mathematical treatment.”126 The truth-value of these
facts remained beyond question, but the results of their mathematical treat-
ment, which was considered to take place on the level of theory, contained only
probabilistic truth. Bessel and Neumann’s distinction between probable theory
and true fact can be interpreted as a continuation of the tendency to define fact
and theory in opposite terms, which, as I have argued, had its roots in the late
eighteenth century.
The Incomplete and Objective Facts of Quellenkritik
I have shown that the concept of fact played a prominent role in the shaping of
the identity of a German discipline of physics, and that German physicists
linked the pursuit of fact to practices such as laboratory work and mathemat-
ical precision measurement, which they taught at specialized university insti-
tutes. In the remaining part of this section, I shift focus to the emerging
historical discipline, discussing two of its foundational figures: Wilhelm von
Humboldt (1767–1835) and Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). Humboldt and
Ranke interpreted and used the concept of fact in different ways. Furthermore,
their understanding of facts differed with respect to their Go¨ttingen predeces-
sors and their contemporaries in physics.
Although no practitioner of history himself, Wilhelm von Humboldt was
deeply concerned about the foundations of the emerging discipline. As a dis-
ciple of Schlo¨zer and an admirer of the Go¨ttingen School in general, he
advocated the relevance of philological methods for historiography.127 Still,
his views on the foundations of historiography deviated from those of his
124. Ibid., 387.
125. Kathryn M. Olesko, “The Meaning of Precision: The Exact Sensibility in Early
Nineteenth-Century Germany,” in The Values of Precision, ed. M. Norton Wise (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995), 103–34, on 115; Olesko, Physics as a Calling (ref. 121), 451–58.
126. As quoted by Stichweh, Zur Entstehung wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen (ref. 11), 223.
127. Beiser, Historicist Tradition (ref. 13), 170–71.
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teacher Schlo¨zer in multiple respects. The fluid concept of fact, to which
Humboldt added his own interpretation, lays bare some of these differences.
While putting forward a historical methodology that balanced reason and
experience, Humboldt adjusted the notion of fact. He defined it as the creative
and imperfect result of historical research rather than as its unquestionable
empirical basis.
Humboldt shared his views on proper historical method in a famous 1821
lecture called “Ueber die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers.”128 At the Prussian
Academy, Humboldt claimed it to be the basic task of the historian “to show
what has happened.” But he readily acknowledged this task to be impossible,
because of the fundamental incompleteness of historical source material. This
had implications for the results of history writing, which Humboldt labeled
“the facts of history.” As he explained it: “the [Thatsachen] of history are little
more than the results of tradition and research, which one has come to accept
as true.”129 Furthermore, Humboldt argued that with the best-as-possible
reconstruction of what has happened—that is, by the establishment of histor-
ical facts—the historian had fulfilled only one part of his task. Humboldt
emphasized that the historian should aim to capture the true historical facts
in their entirety. “The truth of anything that has happened relies on the
inclusion of the invisible part of every [Thatsache],” he argued.130 Humboldt
thus urged historians to complete historical facts. Proper historiography meant
unearthing the ideas behind the mere manifestation of events. This practice of
unearthing was necessary because of the fundamentally incomplete rendition
of the past in historical sources. Only in this way, Humboldt claimed, could
historical truth be approximated.
For Humboldt’s Enlightenment predecessors, such as his mentor Schlo¨zer,
the aim of historiography had been to collect self-evident facts and to arrange
them in systems. Although Humboldt appropriated the Go¨ttingen School’s
emphasis on facts, his aims were different. Rather than to arrange them in
a system, he incited historians to represent the historical facts themselves as
completely as possible. This he understood to be a creative process in which
the imagination of the historian played an important role.
128. Wilhelm von Humboldt, “Ueber die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers,” in Gesammelte
Schriften, ed. Albert Leitzmann, 13 vols. (Berlin: Behr, 1905), vol. 4, 35–56.
129. Ibid., 36.
130. Ibid.
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The fruition of the German historical discipline has probably been associ-
ated most emphatically with Ranke. His adage that the historian ought to show
“how it actually was” is notorious.131 Furthermore, it is well known that Ranke
attached importance to facts. Ranke encouraged his fellow historians not to
ignore the facts, even if they were “unscho¨n.”132 In an 1831 letter to his brother
Heinrich, Ranke stated that “my basic idea is to recognize, to penetrate, and to
show the [Fakten] as they are. The true doctrine lies in the knowledge of
[Thatsachen].”133
By now it may be clear that Ranke was not the first to put facts at the heart
of German historical research. Indeed, Ranke’s found much inspiration in
the empirically oriented and anti-speculative ideals of the Go¨ttingen
School.134 The impact of Ranke’s appeal to factual method, however, was
even greater than that of his Go¨ttingen predecessors had been. This was due
especially to Ranke’s teaching at the University of Berlin between 1825 and
1870. Parallel to the pedagogical innovations in physics of Magnus and
Neumann in Berlin and Ko¨nigsberg, Ranke’s small-scale and method-ori-
ented “exercises” (U¨bungen) were of great importance to the formation of the
historical discipline. Like his colleagues teaching physics, Ranke emphasized
that his teaching focused on facts. At one point, Ranke recalled it as the goal
of his earliest exercise sessions in Berlin to have been “the establishment of
[Thatsachen] in chronological order.”135
Moreover, Ranke shared Magnus’ aversion to philosophical methods. In the
1820s, he engaged in a polemic with Berlin’s philosophical school of history
revolving around Hegel. Hegel blamed Ranke’s Quellenkritik for merely pre-
senting detail after detail, without any unified picture in sight. Ranke, in turn,
criticized Hegel’s philosophical approach for ignoring the limitations of his-
torical knowledge, and for deductively imposing theoretical schemes on the
131. Anthony Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999), 34–61.
132. Leopold von Ranke, Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Vo¨lker von 1494 bis
1535 (Leipzig: G. Reimer, 1824), vii.
133. Walther Peter Fuchs, ed., Leopold von Ranke: Das Briefwerk (Hamburg: Hoffmann und
Campe, 1949), 249.
134. Kasper R. Eskildsen, “Leopold Ranke’s Archival Turn: Location and Evidence in Modern
Historiography,” Modern Intellectual History 5, no. 3 (2008): 425–53, on 431–32.
135. Kasper R. Eskildsen, “Private U¨bungen und verko¨rpertes Wissen: Zur Unterrichtspraxis
der Geschichtswissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Akademische Wissenskulturen: Praktiken des
Lehrens und Forschens vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne, ed. Martin Kintzinger and Sita Steckel
(Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2015), 143–61, on 149.
332 | T EN HAGEN
facts of history.136 In an 1831 lecture, he argued that “speculation departs from
the reality of the [Thatsache] in every aspect . . . there is an inner divide between
the concept of philosophy and the [Faktum].”137
Ranke subscribed to the Humboldtian view that the historian should
make the invisible aspects of historical facts visible. During a lecture at the
University of Berlin in 1845/1846, Ranke introduced the “strict method” of
history as “the extraction of pure [Faktum].”138 At the same time, he encour-
aged his students to look beyond pure fact. This was because he was
“convinced that this [Faktum] has a spiritual content. The [Thatsache] is not
the outermost limit. What has happened is not the ultimate thing we can
know. There is something that happens inside of it.”139 So, like Humboldt,
Ranke believed that there was more to historical practice than the mere
establishment of facts. That being said, Ranke, like the members of the
Go¨ttingen School, seemed optimistic about the possibility of finding “pure
fact” in the first place.
A novelty in Ranke’s conception of factuality was the link he established
between fact and “objectivity.” For Ranke, objective knowledge meant unin-
terpreted knowledge, as directly extracted from the archive.140 In 1862, he put
it as follows: “It is important to free contemporary history from the influence
of personal interests and opinions and to obtain an independent position from
which a general view, the objective truth, unfolds.”141 According to Ranke,
historical facts were to be presented and discussed objectively, that is, without
being obscured by tradition or individual interpretation.
When comparing Ranke’s ideals to his practice, his procedures strike as
more speculative and less impersonal than some of his methodological state-
ments suggest. Yet, an image of Rankean historiography as demanding nothing
but objective facts, which Ranke had cultivated himself, became increasingly
persistent as the nineteenth century ran its course. For example, Hermann
Wesendonck, reflecting on the nature of the German historical discipline in
1876, characterized the dominant school of Ranke as wishing “to let the
[Thatsachen] speak alone; the reader shouldn’t notice one single aspect of the
136. Beiser, Historicist Tradition (ref. 13), 258–66.
137. Volker Dotterweich and Walther Peter Fuchs, eds., Leopold von Ranke: Aus Werk und
Nachlass, Vorlesungseinleitungen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1975), 75.
138. Ibid., 177.
139. Ibid.
140. Eskildsen, “Ranke’s Archival Turn” (ref. 134), 437.
141. Dotterweich and Fuchs, Ranke: Vorlesungseinleitungen (ref. 137), 306.
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historian.”142 Above all, Rankean historiography was thus labelled as demand-
ing the facts to speak for themselves, despite Ranke’s repeated insistence that
historians should capture the idea beyond the facts.143
Divergent Interpretations on a Common Basis
During the first decades of the nineteenth century, physics and history formed
around different objects of research, developed distinct research practices, and
founded independent institutions. Still, in this period of discipline formation,
there was an epistemological discourse that transcended the emerging boundaries
of physics and historiography. Both physicists and historians aimed to ban
philosophical speculations from their discipline, while developing research and
teaching practices that focused on facts. That being said, the practices as well as
their exact interpretations of the concept of fact were different. For instance, the
idea that facts needed to be completed was characteristic of German historiog-
raphy, whereas the connection of facts with a probabilistic notion of truth was
typical of German physics. So, although nineteenth-century German historiog-
raphy and physics shared an empirical outlook and a strong orientation of facts,
divergent interpretations of the concept of fact emerged on that shared basis.144
Until around 1800, the empirical study of the human and natural world was
regarded as part of the same historical and fact-oriented knowledge tradition.
For example, even though universal historian Schlo¨zer acknowledged the dif-
ferences between natural and human objects of study, he emphasized the
principal unity of the methods of human and natural history. In contrast, over
the course of the nineteenth century, the methods of natural and historical
knowledge were portrayed increasingly often as fundamentally distinct, despite
their common orientation on facts. It demands further study if and how the
142. Hermann F. Wesendonck, Die Begru¨ndung der neueren Deutschen Geschichtsschreibung
durch Gatterer und Schlo¨zer (Leipzig: J.W. Kru¨ger, 1876), 128.
143. Later in the nineteenth century, the feasibility of uninterpreted historical knowledge and
the notion of “objective fact” was severely criticized, for example, by Johann Droysen. Droysen
regarded it as essential to abandon some of the “confusing concepts of Quellenkritik,” including
the “objective fact.” Rudolf Hu¨bner, ed., Historik: Vorlesungen u¨ber Enzyklopa¨die und Metho-
dologie der Geschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1937), 139.
144. Taking physics and historiography as representative disciplines for the sciences and
humanities, the results of this study shed light on Julian Hamann’s claim that German intellectuals
defined the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften as “equal but different.” Julian Ha-
mann, “BoundaryWork between Two Cultures: Demarcating theModern Geisteswissenschaften,”
History of Humanities 3, no. 1 (2018): 27–38.
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emergence of different conceptions of factuality in different disciplines shaped
the historical demarcation between natural and historical knowledge and,
ultimately, between the sciences and the humanities.145 It is quite possible
that the spiritual content and incomplete character of historical facts empha-
sized by Ranke and Humboldt played a role in this development, given that
such interpretations were uncommon among naturalists.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have sketched a long-term historical trajectory of the concept
of fact in the German academic context. I started from the introduction of the
term Thatsache in 1756, and followed the concept up to the crucial role it
played in the formation of the modern disciplines of physics and history.
While the relations between existing fields of knowledge transformed by the
genesis of the modern system of knowledge disciplines, the concept of fact
transformed as well. In Germany between 1750 and 1850, it knew different
interpretations in different intellectual contexts.
These varying shapes of the concept of fact—I have counted at least five
pairs of contrasting interpretations—prove that the concept was genuinely
fluid in the German context around 1800. To begin with, facts were usually
interpreted as true, as in the Go¨ttingen School’s universal history, but also as
probable, as in theological history. Furthermore, some German scholars, like
Lichtenberg, considered facts to be strictly empirical. Others, however, such as
Kant, argued that Thatsachen could be empirical and rational. Additionally,
facts could be defined either as the object or the result of research, as speaking
for themselves or requiring completion, and as directly referring to events or
phenomena or as propositions about events or phenomena. These ambiguities
surrounding the concept of fact in the studied contexts were further magnified
by the circulation of multiple terms and spellings, including factum, Factum,
Faktum, T(h)atsache, and T(h)atsatz, as well as their plurals.
Despite this conceptual and terminological fluidity, it is possible to discern
some general transformations of the concept of fact in the German context
145. Denise Phillips has studied these dynamics by tracing the changing meaning of “positive
knowledge” in the first half of the nineteenth century. Denise Phillips, “Trading Epistemological
Insults: ‘Positive Knowledge’ and Natural Science in Germany, 1800–1850,” in The Worlds of
Positivism: A Global Intellectual History, 1770–1930, ed. Johannes Feichtinger, Franz. L. Fillafer,
and Jan Surman (Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 137–53.
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around 1800. These related to the formation of the modern disciplinary system
at German universities. Focusing on the academic context of Go¨ttingen, I have
argued that, in the late eighteenth century, a fact-based epistemology emerged in
several interrelated empirical or so-called historical fields of knowledge, compris-
ing both human and natural study. Facts were regarded as the eternal, unchange-
able, and empirical building blocks of the Lehrgeba¨ude ofWissenschaft, and put in
contradistinction with fleeting theories, hypotheses, and speculations. Initially,
the fact thus existed as a historical concept. There was consensus among German
scholars that, although they formed its basis, facts were not Wissenschaft.
From around 1800 onward, this changed. For many early-nineteenth-century
historians and physicists, facts, as extracted from archival or experimental study,
came to constitute the essence of wissenschaftliches knowledge. Simultaneously,
physics and history gained prestige as knowledge enterprises worth pursuing for
their own sake, rather than ones put to the service of higher forms of knowledge.
The new status of facts coincided with the development of discipline-specific,
fact-oriented research and teaching practices. I have shown how factuality in
German historiography stood central to the method of archival source criticism,
as practiced in Ranke’s historical exercises in Berlin, and how the familiarization
of a new generation of mathematically oriented German physicists with error
analysis and probability theory widened the schism between fact and theory.
Looking beyond the confines of this study, it should yet be explored if and
how the concept of fact further transformed in the disciplinary vocabularies of
physicists and historians in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, there remains
much to discover about the history of the concept of fact in the social and
behavioral sciences. Last but not least, it is worth asking how this German
narrative compares to other national contexts, such as the English and the French.
I raise these questions to emphasize that this study is part of a larger history
of the concept of fact, and of epistemological concepts in general. All too often,
fundamental concepts like “fact,” “data,” or “objectivity” are taken for granted.
Yet their histories, which reach across geographical and disciplinary bound-
aries, teach us that they have always had a flexible nature. Therefore, not these
concepts themselves, but their ongoing transformations are inevitable.
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